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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AB 32: California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 
AEMTC: Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit 
BMU: Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
BMWi: Ministry of Economics and Technology 
CAISO: California Independent System Operator 
CEC: California Energy Commission 
CPUC: California Public Utility Commission 
CSI: California Solar Initiative  
DOE LGP: Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program 
EEG: Renewable Energy Act 
FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
FIT: Feed-in Tariff 
GEGEA: Green Energy and Green Economy Act 
HTRP: Solar Roofs Program 
IESO: Independent Electricity System Operator 
IOU: Investor owned utilities 
ITC: Investment Tax Credit 
kW: Kilowatt 
MASH: Multifamily Affordable Solar Housing 
MW: Megawatt 
NSHP: New Solar Homes Partnership 
OEB: Ontario Energy Board 
OPA: Ontario Power Authority 
OPG: Ontario Power Generation 
OSEA: Ontario Sustainable Energy Association 
PG&E: Pacific Gas & Electric 
POU: Publicly owned utilities 
PV: Photovoltaics 
RAM: Renewable Auction Mechanism 
RESOP: Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program 
RPS: Renewables Portfolio Standard 
SASH: Single Family Affordable Solar Housing 
SCE: Southern California Edison 
SDG&E: San Diego Gas & Electric 
StrEG: Electricity Feed-in Act 
TW: Terawatt 
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INTRODUCTION 
The global energy landscape is in flux, with many jurisdictions attempting to navigate towards a more 
sustainable low-carbon trajectory. Renewable energy technologies have emerged as key pillars of this 
reorientation. With the objective of steering the energy system towards a lower carbon configuration, 
among other goals, policymakers have developed incentive mechanisms aimed at encouraging renewable 
energy deployment. The electricity sector has surfaced as a focal point for this policy engagement, with 
numerous favourable policy frameworks implemented globally. Solar photovoltaic technologies (PV), in 
particular, have attracted increasing policy attention as a potential key role-player in the energy mix 
capable of realizing GHG reductions as well as a variety of economic benefits. 
 
PV presents many promising opportunities for the transition to a low-carbon society. This technology has 
minimal variable costs as it generates electricity from solar radiation using semiconductor materials with 
no moving parts. PV is a carbon-free modular electricity source, which can be deployed at many scales 
and in various applications (centralized or decentralized). Decentralized solar installations generate 
electricity at the point of consumption, reducing the need to invest in costly transmission infrastructure 
and preventing line losses. Solar energy production also tends to follow peak periods of consumption as 
clear sunny days often coincide with energy-intensive uses like indoor cooling. As PV module costs fall, 
due to learning effects and economies of scale, this technology has become increasingly competitive with 
conventional sources. Moreover, industrial development opportunities have been realized by a number of 
jurisdictions through aggressive policy support. 
 
However, PV and the policy frameworks that have been developed to support this technology face serious 
and growing challenges. Increasingly, technical issues related to renewable energy deployment are posing 
problems for grid operators. For example, maintaining system reliability is being complicated by the 
increased penetration of intermittent renewables. Solutions exist to technical problems (smart grid 
technologies, electricity storage, demand response, etc), but have largely been inadequately developed 
and supported to date. From a social and political perspective, renewable energy deployment (in particular 
PV) remains quite controversial. The perceived impact of renewable energy policy support on electricity 
rates has resulted in calls to terminate support in some jurisdictions. Moreover, government support for 
PV has been touted as a promising industrial development strategy (in the United States, Germany and 
Ontario for instance), but recent events – mainly, massive module price reductions and an extremely 
competitive environment brought about by the scaling up of Asian module production – call into question 
the feasibility of this approach and the economic justification for policy intervention. If social and 
technical challenges are not overcome, PV development may stagnate, marginalizing a potential key 
contributor to energy supply and GHG reductions.  
 
In order to overcome obstacles and successfully realize the benefits of renewable energy technologies like 
PV, innovative policy solutions and best practices gleaned from international experiences will need to be 
developed and implemented. This report explores the policy frameworks surrounding PV in three 
jurisdictions – Ontario, California and Germany – and draws lessons from these experiences. Incentive 
mechanisms, challenges, contextual developments and deployment outcomes are analyzed, followed by 
broad lessons forming the basis for general policy advice.   
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PV POLICY FRAMEWORK IN ONTARIO 
 
Introduction 
The province of Ontario has had a relatively brief engagement encouraging the deployment of solar PV. 
Nevertheless, this jurisdiction has made significant progress in terms of PV diffusion. The adoption of 
this technology has been spurred on by a favourable policy framework consisting of key pieces of 
legislation and incentive mechanisms. The following sections will explore the support policies 
surrounding PV in Ontario. Before addressing the policy framework around PV in greater detail, a broad 
understanding of the province and its electricity system is necessary.  
 
Context 
Ontario is Canada’s most heavily populated province with roughly 13 million inhabitants (Statistics 
Canada, 2010). As of 2012, the province’s GDP amounted to $638 billion and the principal economic 
sectors in terms of nominal GDP included: real estate services (12.9%), health and education (12.8%), 
manufacturing (12.4%), retail trade (11.4%), finance (10.1%), construction (6.7%) and various other 
service industries (21.2%) (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2012a & 2012b). Ontario is governed through a 
Westminster-style parliamentary democracy with a Premier acting as the head of government and a 
Lieutenant Governor acting as the ceremonial head of state. The Canadian constitution outlines the 
division of power between the provinces and the federal government. Historically, matters falling within 
provincial jurisdiction tend to be fiercely guarded by the provinces. Most importantly for this discussion, 
the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity fall primarily under provincial jurisdiction. 
 
Electricity Sector in Ontario 
The primary actors surrounding the electricity system in Ontario have changed substantially over the last 
two decades. Before 1998, Ontario’s electrical grid and power generating assets were owned and operated 
by the provincially owned monopoly, Ontario Hydro. The pricing regime under this system was regulated 
and prices tended to remain low due to a sizeable legacy fleet of inexpensive hydro facilities. However, 
Ontario Hydro encountered a number of increasingly acute problems from the 1970s until its demise in 
the 1990s. These included: overexpansion of capacity, ballooning debt, falling electricity demand, nuclear 
cost overruns, and the mismanagement of the nuclear file. Together, these forces led to a crisis of 
legitimacy for the public utility and in 1998 the Progressive Conservative government, under Mike 
Harris, restructured the government monopoly and introduce free market principles into the Ontario 
electricity system. The Electricity Act and the Energy Competition Act (1998) saw the division of Ontario 
Hydro into Ontario Power Generation (OPG), the Independent Market Operator (later renamed the 
Independent Electricity System Operator or IESO), Hydro One, the Ontario Electrical Safety Association 
and the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation (for more information about specific actors, see Table 
1). However, Ontario’s market liberalization process was never fully realized, resulting in a hybrid 
regulated market. The hybrid system consists of a wholesale electricity market for large electricity 
consumers and a regulated price plan for designated consumers. The regulated rates allow smaller 
electricity consumers and households to remain insulated from market volatility. The regulated plan is 
reviewed by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) every six months. 
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Table 1: Key Actors within the Electricity System in Ontario 
 
The electricity supply mix in Ontario consists of a diverse portfolio of sources. Ontario’s 34,079 
megawatts (MW) of installed capacity is made up of nuclear (33%), gas (29%), coal (10%), hydro (23%), 
wind (4.4%) and other sources (0.8%) (IESO, 2012). This capacity does not factor in small electricity 
producers connected to the distribution network – mainly solar PV and other renewables. According to 
the OPA’s 2011 fourth quarter report (2012a), solar PV accounts for an additional 419.4 MW of capacity 
or roughly 1.22% of total supply. As of 2011, electricity demand in the province amounted to 141.5 
terawatt-hours (TWh). Most of this demand was met by generation from nuclear and hydro facilities (see 
figure 1 for details). Total electricity demand is projected to rise to 146 TWh by 2015 and 165 TWh by 
2030 (Ontario Power Authority, 2010a). Ontario’s system has interconnections with Quebec, Manitoba, 
New York, Michigan and Minnesota. According to the Long-term Energy Plan and ministerial directives, 
the province intends to meet rising demand through natural gas, renewable energy (10,700 MW of new 
capacity by 2018) and conservation. Nuclear is expected to continue to meet approximately 50% of 
electricity demand in the province through refurbishments and potential new reactor construction. 
  
Key Actors Role 
Ontario Ministry of Energy The Minister of Energy sets the legal and policy framework by 
drafting legislation and regulations that govern the energy sector. 
Ontario Energy Board (OEB) The OEB was established under the Ontario Energy Board Act in 
1960 to regulate the energy sector in the public interest. 
Ontario Power Authority (OPA) The OPA was established under the Electricity Restructuring Act in 
2004 to plan for the current and future electricity system through the 
development of Integrated Power System Plans (IPSPs). This 
agency is responsible for ensuring the medium and long-term 
reliability of the electricity system in Ontario. The OPA is also 
mandated to establish objectives and implement programs related 
to conservation, demand management and renewable power 
generation. 
Ontario Power Generation (OPG) The OPG was created under the Electricity Act in 1998 as a crown 
corporation entrusted with the ownership and operation of the 
electricity generation assets divested by the former Ontario Hydro. 
Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) The IESO is a not-for-profit corporate entity established in 1998 by 
the Electricity Act of Ontario to ensure reliability of the electricity 
system through forecasting and balancing supply and demand. This 
organization is responsible for operating the wholesale electricity 
market in Ontario. 
Hydro One Hydro One is a crown corporation mandated to procure, maintain 
and operate transmission and distribution infrastructure. 
Ontario Hydro (now defunct) Ontario Hydro was the crown corporation established to generate, 
transmit, distribute, supply and sell electricity in Ontario. 
Additionally, this entity was mandated to implement conservation 
and efficiency programs in the province. In 1998, under the Energy 
Competition Act, Ontario Hydro was split into five distinct entities 
(OPG, IESO, Hydro One, Ontario Electrical Safety Association and 
Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation). 
POLICY REPORT PV Policy Frameworks 
 
6  
 
 
Figure 1: Electricity Generated by Source in Ontario in 2011 (IESO, 2012) 
 
 
Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program (2006-2009) 
A concerted effort to encourage the diffusion of PV was not made until the Renewable Energy Standard 
Offer Program (RESOP) was established by the OPA in 2006, following an extensive stakeholder 
consultation (Small & Rothman, 2008). In doing so, Ontario became the first North American jurisdiction 
to enact a Feed-in Tariff type system. The stated objectives of the program included: avoiding future 
costly investment in conventional generation sources; meeting renewable energy supply targets; 
encouraging the participation of small electricity generators in the provincial grid; and, minimizing 
environmental impacts of electricity generation (Ontario Power Authority, 2009). In order to satisfy these 
objectives, the RESOP offered 20 year fixed price contracts for electricity generated by grid-connected 
renewable energy sources less than 10MW in capacity. Contracts were available through a streamlined 
application process and offered a price of $0.42/kWh for solar PV and $0.11/kWh for other eligible 
renewables. Developers were responsible for connecting their projects to the distribution system, 
requesting connection impact assessments from the local distribution company and installing the required 
metering equipment. 
 
The RESOP’s design reflected a number of recommendations proposed by stakeholders – the Ontario 
Sustainable Energy Association (OSEA) played a central role in this process (Photiadis & Macdonald, 
2011). However, the OEB and OPA resisted some recommendations that would have seen renewables 
receive highly favourable contract terms, stating that “the design of the standard offer program needs to 
balance the interest of the Government in securing generation from renewable resources against the 
interests of ratepayers and the statutory objectives of the OPA and the OEB” (Ontario Power Authority & 
Ontario Energy Board, 2006). In other words, the RESOP should avoid conflicting with the OEB and 
OPA mandates to provide electricity to ratepayers in a cost-efficient manner. To mitigate this conflict, the 
OPA implemented a value-based price rather than OSEA’s proposed cost-based price which would have 
guaranteed a reasonable return on investment for renewable energy developers (Gipe, Doncaster, & 
MacLeod, 2005). In addition, the OPA did not provide a right to connect to the grid for renewable 
sources. Despite the divergence from OSEA’s recommendations, the RESOP received a significant 
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amount of attention from renewable energy developers. In the first year of the program, the 10 year 
contract target was exceeded. A total of 314 contracts were issued amounting to 1,300MW in capacity or 
$4.9 billion in potential investment (Ontario Power Authority, 2008). 
 
The overwhelming number of contracts offered under the RESOP raised serious questions about the 
design of the program (Small & Rothman, 2008). In fact, a loophole existed that allowed large 
developers, who should have been competing under competitive procurement processes, to take part in 
the RESOP. The loophole permitted large developers to divide projects into numerous smaller projects of 
10MW or less in order to qualify for the RESOP. Well-established developers were quick to take 
advantage of the program and far better organized than the smaller firms or community groups for whom 
the program was intended. Furthermore, there was no application fee, so developers could hold numerous 
contracts and exercise them as free options if conditions became favourable. In turn, the limited grid 
capacity available for renewable projects was rapidly taken up by large entities, forcing smaller and 
slower applicants to wait for capacity upgrades. Moreover, small developers met with a number of 
financial and institutional challenges that further complicated their involvement in the program (Adachi & 
Rowlands, 2010).  
 
In light of the issues mentioned above, the OPA initiated the first program review after 18 months instead 
of the scheduled 24 months (Small & Rothman, 2008). Applications were frozen during the program 
review process and a series of revisions were proposed to rectify the challenges faced by the RESOP. 
Program revisions included: restricting projects to under 10MW per transformer station to prevent 
developers from breaking up large projects in order to fit under the 10MW cap; limiting proponents to no 
more than 50MW of uncompleted contracts at any one time; and improving efficiency by nullifying 
contracts that did not progress towards completion. 
 
Overall, the program did succeed in increasing the amount of renewables in the supply mix and creating a 
burgeoning niche market for renewable energy technologies. As of 2012, the RESOP was responsible for 
encouraging the deployment of nearly 311.2 MW of PV with an additional 170 MW still under 
development. The majority of the province’s current PV installations were carried out under this program.  
 
 
The Green Energy and Economy Act and the Feed-in Tariff (2009-present) 
The Green Energy and Green Economy Act (GEGEA) is a central component of Ontario’s PV policy 
framework. The GEGEA was tabled in early 2009 and less than a month later it passed into law. The act 
was designed to attract investment in the electricity system, facilitate the coal phase out and position 
Ontario as a leading clean energy economy (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2010). The development of the 
GEGEA was facilitated by three key events: (1) campaigns by stakeholders recommending the adoption 
of a European style  FIT program, (2) the Minister of Energy’s visit to Europe with the purpose of 
learning about renewable energy policy options (Rand, 2010), and (3) the global financial crisis and 
corresponding employment losses in Ontario’s traditional manufacturing sector.  
 
The GEGEA amended several pieces of legislation and ushered in the creation of a FIT program 
(Yatchew & Baziliauskas, 2011). The act articulated a series of ambitious objectives including the 
creation of 50,000 jobs in the first three years and the development of a green energy economy in Ontario. 
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The act streamlined the approval process for renewable energy projects, provided priority access for 
renewable energy to the grid and allowed for the development of a FIT system – replacing the RESOP. 
The GEGEA expanded ministerial direction of the OEB and OPA as well as added the promotion of 
renewable generation to the OEB mandate. This brought these bodies further under government control 
and shifted their objectives away from economic efficiency in favour of encouraging renewables. 
 
In September 2009, the Minister of Energy directed the OPA to implement the FIT program (Ontario 
Power Authority, 2010b). The FIT program offers 20 year contracts for renewable energy projects of 
10kW or more, whereas the microFIT is a streamlined version of the FIT program for sources under 
10kW (Yatchew & Baziliauskas, 2011). The FIT incorporates a pricing schedule that takes into account 
the various costs associated with each type of renewable energy technology and allows for a reasonable 
rate of return on investment (see table 2 for the FIT price schedule for PV). The cost of the FIT is 
incorporated into energy prices and passed onto electricity consumers. The cost of connecting to the grid 
is borne by the developer, while the cost of upgrading the grid to accommodate projects is carried by 
ratepayers. Projects that require grid upgrades must pass an economic connection test to determine the 
financial feasibility of grid connection. In order to qualify for a FIT contract, projects must source a 
certain proportion of parts and labour from domestic sources (see table 3). Domestic content requirements 
are intended to stimulate regional economic development and the growth of Ontario’s renewable energy 
technology industry. Additionally, the FIT offers eligible projects priority access to the grid over 
conventional energy sources. Since transmission and distribution infrastructure in Ontario is limited, the 
FIT shelters renewable projects from having to compete with conventional sources for access to the grid. 
Ultimately, the program sacrifices the traditional economic efficiency criteria in favour of advancing 
environmental and industrial policy objectives.  
 
From October 2011 until July 2012, the FIT program underwent a scheduled two-year review. The central 
considerations that emerged from the review and consultation process included: the downward adjustment 
of FIT rates to reflect falling costs; the improvement of procedures and processes; and, the encouragement 
of community involvement in, and acceptance of, the program (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2012a). The 
review prompted: (1) rates to be significantly reduced for rooftop and ground-mounted PV applications; 
(2) the further segmentation of the program into three project size categories – each with different rules – 
consisting of the microFIT (up to 10kW), smallFIT (10-500kW) and largeFIT (500kW-10MW); (3) the 
establishment of an annual cap for PV installed capacity under the largeFIT (capacity cap yet to be 
determined), smallFIT (200MW) and microFIT (50MW); (4) the introduction of an application window 
(October 1st – November 30th 2012) rather than the ongoing acceptance of applications; (5) the 
development of a point system for ranking applications (projects with a greater number of points are 
awarded contracts first); in addition to a number of other revisions. The point system ranks projects in 
terms of several criteria, including community involvement (see Table 4).  
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Table 2: Ontario FIT Price Schedule for PV (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2012a) 
Renewable Technology Capacity Original Price $/kWh Revised Price $/kWh % Change 
Solar PV     
Rooftop (MicroFIT) N: 0.802 0.549 -31.5% 
Rooftop  !N:N: 0.713 0.548 -23.1% 
<250kW 
Rooftop > 100 N:N: 0.635 0.539 -15.1% 
!N:N: 
Rooftop > 500 kW 0.539 0.487 -9.6% 
     
Ground Mounted N: 0.642 0.445 -30.7% 
 !N:N: 0.443 0.388 -12.4% 
 !N:0: 0.443 0.350 -21% 
 > 5 MW 0.443 0.347 -21.7% 
 
Table 3: Ontario FIT Domestic Content Requirements for PV (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2012a) 
Minimum Domestic Content Level Year of Commercial Operation 
Solar PV projects over 10 kW and less than or equal to 10 MW 
25% Before January 1, 2012 
60% On or after January 1, 2012 
MicroFIT Projects 
40% 2009-2010 
60% 2011 and later 
 
Table 4: Ontario FIT Point System (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2012b) 
Project Type Points 
Local Community (min. 15% equity) 3 
Aboriginal Participation (min. 15% equity) 3 
Public Schools, Colleges, 
Universities, Hospitals & 
Long-Term Care Facilities (min. 15% equity) 
2 
Additional Points 
Municipal Council Support Resolution 2 
Aboriginal Community Support Resolution 2 
Project Readiness 2 
Projects that applied on or before July 4, 2011 1 
Projects that applied on or after July 5th, 2011 0.5 
Education or Health Host 2 
System Benefit (water and bioenergy) 1 
 
The FIT program (including microFIT) has been very successful in encouraging the deployment of PV. 
As of June 2012, 10,299 FIT applications totalling 21,292 MW of new renewable supply have been 
submitted (Ontario Power Authority, 2012a). Of these applications, 1,809 contracts amounting to 4,562 
MW were either under development or in commercial operation. PV accounts for 90.38% (1,635) of total 
FIT contracts and 26.37% (1,203 MW) of total potential capacity under the program.  
 
Despite the huge gains in PV penetration promoted by the FIT, the program and PV deployment are faced 
with a series of challenges. First, the limited transmission and distribution capacity available for 
additional generation remains a serious barrier. Many projects are stalled in anticipation for future grid 
upgrades (D'Aliesio, 2011). Second, the FIT is increasingly the target of ratepayer backlash due to rising 
electricity prices (Harvey, 2011). However, according to OPA’s Long-term Energy Plan (2010a), 
renewable energy support is expected to account for roughly half of the 7.9% annual electricity rate 
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increases with the rest attributable to other factors like nuclear refurbishment projects, investment in new 
natural gas generation as well as transmission upgrades. In an attempt to allay public displeasure with 
rising electricity rates, the Liberal government implemented a Clean Energy Benefit which credits 
residential and small business customers 10% of their electricity bills. In doing so, the Liberals have 
diluted their conservation and efficiency goals. Third, the domestic content requirements have resulted in 
much controversy internationally. Japan and the EU have launched challenges against the FIT domestic 
content rules with the World Trade Organization (Blackwell, 2010; Trew, 2012). International PV 
manufacturers have similarly argued that the domestic content rules will cost the province $2 billion in 
forgone investment annually (McCarthy, 2010). Domestic content rules are also faulted with creating 
market distortions as Ontario PV firms are effectively sheltered from foreign competition. Fourth, during 
the provincial election held in October 2011 the Progressive Conservative leader, Tim Hudak, vehemently 
opposed the FIT program. Initial polls indicated that Hudak would likely win the election, which created a 
tremendous amount of uncertainty for the Ontario solar industry. Fifth, community groups and their 
representatives have become increasingly critical of Ontario’s electricity policy direction. For example, 
Wind Resistance Ontario (formerly Wind Concerns Ontario), a grassroots organization opposing wind 
turbine development, rallied behind the Progressive Conservative party during the 2011 provincial 
election in which the Liberals lost their majority and most of their rural support (Howlett & Ladurantaye, 
2011). In addition, the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, under pressure from its membership, backed 
away from its initial support for renewable energy deployment and called for the suspension of wind 
development until “farm families and rural residents are assured that their interests are adequately 
protected” (Ontario Federation of Agriculture, 2012). More recently, some PV firms have expressed their 
discontent with the FIT review results, which were initially well received by stakeholders. More 
precisely, the SkyPower Group, Canada’s largest solar energy firm, is suing the province for $100 million 
over recent rule changes (Stinson, 2012). 
 
General Outcomes 
Ontario’s policy support for PV has resulted in some positive outcomes in terms of deployment and 
industrial development. In conjunction with the RESOP, support mechanisms for grid-connected PV have 
resulted in a dramatic increase in deployment over the last several years (see figure 2).  PV capacity in the 
province has ballooned from 0 MW in 2006 – and less than 2 MW in 2007 and 2008 – to over 400 MW in 
2011. The resulting surge in PV has created a number of economic opportunities. More precisely, 
employment in the sector has reportedly taken off, with module and inverter manufacturers locating in 
Ontario in order to take advantage of the generous FIT rates (ClearSky Advisors, 2010; Pollin & Garrett-
Peltier, 2009). However, the employment benefits accruing from PV policy support have been questioned 
(Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2011). And, as the pervious section highlights, challenges 
abound for the technology and government support.  
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Figure 2: PV Deployment in MW from 2006-2011 in Ontario (Ontario Power Authority, 2012b) 
 
 
PV POLICY FRAMEWORK IN CALIFORNIA 
 
Introduction 
In comparison with Ontario, California has had a relatively long history of policy engagement with solar 
PV. California’s abundant solar resource, high electricity prices and scarcity of fossil fuels strongly favors 
investments in solar energy. However, until recently, the technology was not cost-competitive and 
required substantial government support. Historically, California's leaders and institutions have, for the 
most part, encouraged the adoption of PV through a variety of incentive programs and regulations 
(Taylor, 2008). The subsequent sections analyze California’s most prominent policies surrounding PV, 
with a focus on the period following deregulation (2002 and onward). A brief overview of the electricity 
sector in California is also presented. 
 
Context 
With a population exceeding 37 million, California is the most populous state in the US (US Census 
Bureau, 2010). California’s GDP amounted to $1.735 trillion in 2011 or about 13% of the US GDP 
(Glassman, 2012). The principal economic sectors include: real estate (18%), manufacturing (14%), 
government (10%), professional and technical services (10%) retail trade (9%) and information (8%) 
(Glassman, 2012). The state is a democratic republic governed by elected state senators and assembly 
members. The executive branch of government consists of a democratically elected Governor and an 
executive. The legislative branch consists of an assembly and a senate. These two houses have the power 
to draft and adopt legislation — subject to the governor’s signature.  
 
Electricity Sector in California 
Due to its sizeable population and productive economy, California has one of the largest electricity use 
profiles in the country. However, per capita electricity consumption is about half the US average. 
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Progressive energy policy since the 1970s has made California a leader in energy efficiency.  Over the 
past 30 years, per capita electricity consumption in the United States increased by nearly 50 percent while  
per capita electricity use in California remained nearly flat despite increasing economic activity 
(California Energy Commission, 2011a). 
 
The chief agencies involved in energy regulation and distribution are the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC), the California Energy Commission (CEC), Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) and the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). The authority of the 
CPUC and the CEC falls under the state executive branch. The governor, pending approval by the Senate, 
appoints five commissioners to both the CPUC and CEC to serve five-year staggered terms. The 
commissioners that make up FERC are appointed by the US president with advice and consent of the 
Senate to serve five-year terms. FERC oversees the CAISO. The CAISO Board consists of five 
Governors, nominated by the Governor of California and confirmed by the state senate, who serve 
staggered three-year terms.  
 
Table 5: Key Actors within the Electricity System in California 
Key Actors Role 
California Public 
Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) 
The CPUC regulates investor-owned electric and natural gas utilities operating in California. The primary 
responsibilities of the CPUC include: setting electric rates, protecting consumers, promoting energy 
efficiency and ensuring system reliability.  
California Energy 
Commission (CEC) 
The CEC is the primary agency for energy policy and planning. This includes, but is not limited to, 
forecasting future energy needs, siting and licensing large scale power plants, promoting and enforcing 
energy efficiency, supporting research, development and demonstration programs, and supporting 
renewable energy through market support mechanisms.  
Federal Energy 
Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) 
The FERC regulates the interstate transmission of electricity, gas and oil. Its responsibilities with respect to 
electricity include, but are not limited to, regulating the interstate transmission and the wholesale electricity 
market, ensuring the reliability of the high voltage interstate transmission system, and overseeing 
environmental matters related to major electricity policy initiatives.  
California 
Independent System 
Operator (CAISO) 
The CAISO – a non-profit public benefit corporation – was created in 1998 when the state restructured its 
wholesale electricity industry. It controls the flow of electricity through transmission lines, supervises the 
maintenance of this infrastructure, and balances supply and demand through daily market transactions. 
 
Electricity is provided to retail consumers through either Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) or Publicly 
Owned Utilities (POUs). The state’s three large IOUs are: (1) Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), which 
serves most of Northern California; (2) Southern California Edison (SCE), which serves most of Southern 
California; and, (3) San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), which serves most of San Diego County and 
parts of Orange County. These IOUs serve over 80 percent of the state’s electricity demand and are 
mandated with developing both interim and long-term resource procurement plans under the supervision 
of the CPUC (CEC, 2003). POUs, including both municipal utilities and electric cooperatives, serve the 
state’s remaining electricity load (CEC, 2003).  
 
California’s electricity system has changed significantly over the past decade. Prior to deregulation, 
incumbent IOUs were vertically integrated, providing generation, transmission, distribution, metering and 
billing services. Following the inauguration of the competitive electricity market in 1998, California’s 
IOUs were forced to divest many of their assets to independent power producers and customers were 
given a choice in determining their electricity supplier. Electricity was traded on the Power Exchange, 
where power generators competed to sell their electricity in response to bids submitted by large industrial 
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users and distribution companies, among others. After the California electricity crisis of 2000-01, the 
main institutions of the competitive market established through deregulation – the Power Exchange and 
retail choice – were dismantled. In their place, the CAISO was created to oversee power generators and 
grant access to transmission and distribution facilities. The electricity system now operates as a hybrid 
electricity market (State of California, 2003). It has a competitive wholesale electricity market and a 
regulated retail market. The California wholesale market operates as a commodity exchange through the 
centralized and autonomous system operator. The electricity markets use a full network model which 
predicts transmission losses and reactive power load to produce prices at every point in the system. By 
offering locational marginal pricing, the CAISO is taking progressive steps to create a transparent system 
that reflects the actual cost of generating and delivering electricity (CAISO, 2011).  
 
As of 2010, total electricity consumption in California amounted to 290.187 TWh (CEC, 2011a). 
However, the state relied upon imports for 29% of its electricity generation. In-state generation in 2010 
accounted for 205.018 TWh. The in-state portion of electricity output is made up of coal (1.7%), large 
hydro (14.6%), natural gas (53.4%), nuclear (15.7%) and renewables (14.6%). Solar PV accounted for 
roughly 0.4% of total output (although, more recent output is likely much larger). California imports more 
electricity than any other state, primarily hydroelectric power from the Pacific Northwest along with coal 
and natural gas from the desert Southwest. 
 
Figure 3: Electricity Generated by Source in California in 2010 (CEC, 2011a) 
 
 
 
Current Federal Policies 
There are a number of federal incentive programs aimed at encouraging the deployment of solar PV. 
However, many of these programs have reached the limits of available funds or are nearing expiration. 
Furthermore, the focus of this report is on the state policies implemented in California rather than federal 
support. As a result, a brief overview of federal policies will be provided rather than an in-depth analysis. 
The most prominent policies include the Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit (AEMTC), 
Investment Tax Credit (ITC), 1603 Treasury Program, Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program 
(DOE LGP) and several other Department of Energy initiatives. 
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As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the AEMTC was introduced (Platzer, 
2012). It provided a 30% tax credit to advanced energy manufacturers investing in manufacturing 
facilities in the United States. A number of prominent PV module manufacturers were funded by the 
AEMTC. The support mechanism has reached its funding cap of $2.3 billion and is awaiting potential 
renewal. 
 
The DOE LGP, also part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, provided loan 
guarantees to solar PV projects and renewable energy developers more broadly (Platzer, 2012). The DOE 
LGP provided $13.2 billion in funding for solar projects and manufacturers before expiring in 2011. A 
number of the PV manufacturers funded under this program have experienced financial difficulties, 
restructurings and bankruptcies as a result of the turbulent economic landscape surrounding PV over the 
last year. 
 
The ITC for solar installations has been in effect since the Energy Tax Act passed into law in 1978 
(Platzer, 2012). The ITC provides a 30% tax credit for solar project costs until 2016. Eligible projects 
include residential and commercial installations. After 2016, the program will revert to a 10% tax credit 
for commercial projects only. In 2009, the ITC was revised to allow for direct cash grants rather than tax 
credits to appeal to a larger group of investors. 
 
The 1603 Treasury Program provided cash grants to eligible solar projects until the end of 2011 (Platzer, 
2012). The grants amounted to 30% of the total cost of the solar system and were highly successful in 
encouraging deployment. The 1603 Treasury Program awarded over $2.1 billion in funds to roughly 
33,000 solar projects.  
 
The Department of Energy has also invested heavily in initiatives encouraging the development and 
commercialization of emerging PV technologies and advanced manufacturing processes. 
 
Early Efforts (1970-2002) 
California has a long and textured history of supporting the diffusion of solar technologies. Early efforts 
consisted of upstream investments, incentive programs and regulatory changes that can be traced back as 
far as the oil shocks of the 1970s. These early efforts have shaped the institutions surrounding the solar 
industry and informed the development of modern support policies. Prominent early initiatives included: 
favourable long-term contracts for utility-scale PV projects as part of the state’s interpretation and 
implementation of the federal government’s Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act in the late 1970s; the 
provision of installation rebates by IOUs for distributed PV systems, dating back to the 1980s (in 
particular, the Renewable Energy Program funded initiatives); and, various net-metering retail credits 
offered by IOUs, which have been in place since 1996 (Taylor, 2008). Until recently, many of the PV 
incentive mechanisms were carried out under a number of broad renewable energy programs (Self-
Generation Incentive Program, Emerging Renewables Program, etc). However, in 2007, many of the PV 
incentives were consolidated under the Go Solar Initiative (outlined below) and therefore only their 
current iterations are discussed.  
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The majority of support policies have been funded through various system surcharges paid by electricity 
consumers and collected by utilities. It is worth noting that California has implemented an electricity rate 
schedule that mitigates price increases for low-income households related to modernizing the electric 
grid. 
 
Renewable Portfolio Standard and Associated Programs (2002-Ongoing) 
In 2002, California established a Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) Program, which was jointly 
implemented by the CPUC and the CEC. Under this legislation, utilities were directed to increase the 
proportion of renewable energy generation to 20 percent by 2017. In 2003, the CEC’s Integrated Energy 
Policy Report recommended that the target date be moved forward from 2017 to 2010 (later extended to 
2013). And, in 2004, the CEC’s Energy Report Update recommended an even more aggressive target of 
33% (CEC, 2011b). More recently, in April 2011, California adopted a 33% RPS by 2020, signing into 
law one of the most environmentally ambitious pieces of legislation to date. 
 
The policy objectives articulated through the legislation include: achieving near-term GHG reductions 
along with facilitating a long-term low-carbon transformation of the electricity system; improving energy 
security through diversifying supply and reducing fossil-fuel dependence; improving local environmental 
outcomes and public health; realizing industrial development and economic benefits; and, providing value 
for ratepayers and the system (CPUC, 2009). 
 
The RPS applies to all electricity retailers in the state, including POUs. All of these entities must meet the 
RPS goals of 20% of retails sales from renewables by the end of 2013, 25% by the end of 2016, and 33% 
by 2020. In order to meet these goals, utilities are required to select eligible renewable sources (excluding 
large hydroelectric facilities) that are least cost and best fit for the grid. While the CEC and the CPUC 
work in collaboration to implement RPS goals, it is the responsibility of the CEC to ensure the 
certification of renewable facilities as eligible for the RPS. The CEC has also developed a tracking and 
verification system to ensure proper accounting of renewable energy output within and outside of 
California. RPS Compliance Reports must be filed annually using CEC verified RPS procurement data. 
The CEC may impose penalties of 5 cents per kWh up to $25 million per year for non-compliance 
(CPUC, 2011a). To date, no penalties have been applied. 
 
In order to better understand the impacts of reaching a 33% RPS, the CPUC published a preliminary 
Implementation Analysis report in 2009. The report found that: achieving 33% renewables by 2020 is a 
highly ambitious target requiring significant infrastructure investment; 11 new major transmission lines 
will be required at a cost of $16 billion; a tripling of renewable energy generation will be required, from 
27 TWh in 2009 to 75 TWh in 2020; projected average electricity costs will be 16.7% higher in 2020 
compared to 2008 (in real terms) even if California makes no more investments in renewable energy; and, 
the total statewide expenditures of achieving a 33% RPS is projected to be 10.2% higher than an all gas-
scenario (whereby all new electricity needs are met entirely by natural gas generation).  
 
The RPS has been successful in encouraging the uptake of PV as well as the shift towards renewable 
energy generation. Since 2003, 2,541 MW of renewable energy has come online under the RPS (CPUC, 
2011a). Roughly 830 MW of renewable energy capacity was installed in 2011, much of which was PV 
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and Wind. As of 2012, the renewable energy procurement status of California's three large IOUs was as 
follows: 
• Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) – 20.09% 
• Southern California Edison (SCE) – 21.70% 
• San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) – 20.80% 
 
The RPS has met with resistance from other sectors and even environmental organizations. Critics of the 
legislation tend to argue against the anticipated higher electricity costs associated with the 33% target 
(Weintraub, 2011). Industry in California already pays electricity rates that are about 50 percent higher 
than the rest of the country. Opponents of the legislation argue for the continued use of cheaper, 
conventional energy sources such as coal and natural gas, keeping costs down for business and residential 
ratepayers.  
 
There is also concern among environmental groups related to the potential impact of industrial-scale solar 
projects on land and habitat. The most notable case is that of a proposed 5,130-acre concentrating solar 
installation in the California Mojave desert by the solar firm BrightSource. The project caused intense 
friction between environmentalists and renewable energy developers and was temporarily shelved 
(Rosenthal, 2009). The key issue in the dispute was the use of public land and potentially adverse impacts 
on critical habitat. Utility-scale ground-mounted solar PV may be faced with similar challenges as 
penetration increases. 
 
California Global Warming Solutions Act (2006-Ongoing) 
The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) has helped advance climate related 
objectives including the diffusion of renewable energy and in particular solar PV. The act set a statewide 
carbon reduction target capping emissions at 1990 levels by 2020. Meeting this target has been linked to 
the success of a variety of renewable energy programs (including the RPS and related renewable energy 
support). For instance, the Climate Change Scoping Plan by the California Air Resources Board reported 
that at least 40% of the State’s emission reductions would need to be realized through the electricity 
sector (Wong Kup et al, 2008). 
 
In response to this legislation, two Texas-based oil companies (Valero Energy Corp. and Tesoro Corp.) 
provided funding for the November 2010 statewide Proposition 23 initiative. The goal of the proposition 
was to freeze the provisions of AB 32 until California's unemployment rate dropped to 5.5% or below for 
four consecutive quarters. With current unemployment at roughly 11%, this would be highly unlikely. 
Supporters of the measure argued that it would halt a rise in energy costs at a time when California, hit 
hard by the financial crisis, could least afford it. However, Silicon Valley investors, who have been 
traditional supporters of renewable energy technology, launched a competing campaign opposing 
Proposition 23 (Groom, 2010). And, in November 2010, California voters rejected Proposition 23 with a 
vote of 59%.  
 
Go Solar California Initiative (2007-Ongoing) 
In 2007, the state established the Go Solar California Initiative which encompasses the CEC's New Solar 
Homes Partnership (NSHP) and the CPUC's California Solar Initiative (CSI). The overall budget of the 
initiative is USD $2.167 billion and the objective is to deploy 1,940 MW of solar projects by the end of 
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2016 (CPUC, 2011b). The CSI offers either cash rebates or attractive rates for grid-tied solar 
technologies. The rebate option (Expected Performance-Based Buydown) provides an upfront lump sum 
payment per watt installed based on expected performance, whereas the rate option (Performance-Based 
Incentive) is paid out monthly per kWh generated over 5 years. The rate option is required for systems 
greater than 30 kW, however smaller systems may opt into this mechanism. The incentive, under both 
mechanisms, is linked to the number of installed projects and declines based on predetermined capacity 
steps (see table 2). IOUs are responsible for administering the CSI incentives. Currently, the program has 
reached the lowest incentive levels – between the 8th and 10th step, depending on the service area and 
market segment (residential, commercial or government). However, more than 14 MW are presently 
under review as part of the program, indicating that the incentives remain sufficient to spur on 
deployment. As of May 2012, 839 MW of PV have been installed under the program with 348 MW 
pending installation (CPUC, 2012a). 
 
Table 6: California Solar Initiative Incentives 
  
Expected Performance-Based  
Buydown (per Watt) 
Performance-Based  
Incentive (per kWh) 
Step Statewide MW in Step Residential 
Non-Residential 
Residential 
Non-Residential 
Commercial Government/ 
Non-Profit 
Commercial Government/ 
Non-Profit 
1 50 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 70 $2.50 $2.50 $3.25 $0.39 $0.39 $0.50 
3 100 $2.20 $2.20 $2.95 $0.34 $0.34 $0.46 
4 130 $1.90 $1.90 $2.65 $0.26 $0.26 $0.37 
5 160 $1.55 $1.55 $2.30 $0.22 $0.22 $0.32 
6 190 $1.10 $1.10 $1.85 $0.15 $0.15 $0.26 
7 215 $0.65 $0.65 $1.40 $0.09 $0.09 $0.19 
8 250 $0.35 $0.35 $1.10 $0.04 $0.04 $0.14 
9 285 $0.25 $0.25 $0.90 $0.03 $0.03 $0.11 
10 350 $0.20 $0.20 $0.70 $0.03 $0.03 $0.09 
 
In addition to the above program, the CSI includes a low-income instrument consisting of the Single 
Family Affordable Solar Housing (SASH) and Multifamily Affordable Solar Housing (MASH) programs. 
The primary objectives of low-income mechanisms are to encourage the adoption of PV in the low-
income housing market as well as decrease electricity costs for low-income households (DSIRE, 2012). 
The MASH program provides incentives per watt installed to building owners that offset tenant electricity 
consumption or electricity use within common areas. As of February 2012, this program has resulted in 
over 20 MW of PV deployment (reserved or completed) (Southern California Edison, 2012a). In contrast, 
the SASH program offers low-income households fully or heavily subsidized 1kW PV systems. The 
program is operated by GRID Alternatives, a not-for-profit organization that has engaged with low-
income communities and solar deployment since 2001. As of April 2012, the program deployed over 5 
MW of PV (GRID Alternatives, 2012). 
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The NSHP provides incentives to new home builders to encourage the adoption of grid-connected solar 
PV systems within the new construction market. The program aims to install 400 MW of PV on new 
homes and have solar PV systems on 50% of all new homes by 2016 (DSIRE, 2012). Eligible new 
buildings must exceed efficiency standards by 15%, rewarding efficiency in addition to encouraging PV 
deployment. Four incentive levels are available through the program (see table 3). Similar to the CSI, 
incentives are set to decline once a predetermined installed capacity is reached. The NSHP has received a 
significant amount of interest with over 45 MW of PV capacity approved and 2.5 MW under review as of 
July 2012 (Go Solar California, 2012).  
 
Table 7: California New Solar Homes Partnership Incentive Levels (as of July 2012) 
Incentive Level Expected Performance 
Based Incentive ($/watt) 
Eligibility 
Base $2.00 Fewer than 50% of units 
equipped with PV systems. 
Solar as a Standard Feature $2.25 50% or more units in subdivision 
to be equipped with PV systems 
Affordable 
Residential Areas of 
Affordable Housing Projects 
$2.90 Affordable housing development 
Common Areas of Affordable 
Housing Projects 
$0.00 (originally $3.30) Common areas of affordable 
housing projects 
 
Feed-in Tariff (2008-Ongoing) 
In February 2008, the CPUC implemented a feed-in tariff (FIT) for distributed renewable energy projects 
up to 1.5 MW (now expanded to 3 MW or less) (DSIRE, 2012). The FIT offers 10, 15 or 20 year standard 
contracts administered by the state’s IOUs. Eligible renewable energy projects are paid for electricity 
generation based on the Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff. Unlike the Ontario FIT, California’s 
program does not guarantee a reasonable rate of return and is instead based on market determinants – 
more precisely, the weighted average of the three highest executed contract bids from the Renewable 
Auction Mechanism (discussed in more detail in the following section). The latest rate is expected to be 
USD 0.089/kWh. This rate will be adjusted upward or downward every two months based upon the 
number of applicants that accept the rate and the capacity allocated to the project. The available capacity 
under this program is capped at 750 MW (expanded from 480 MW) for the life of the program, although 
this cap may be increased by CPUC.   
 
The FIT has facilitated the deployment of a sizeable quantity of solar PV. At present, over 200 MW of 
renewable capacity is under development or has entered service (CPUC, 2012b). Solar PV accounts for 
the vast majority of the capacity being deployed under this program (Southern California Edison, 2012b; 
PG&E, 2012).  
 
Renewable Auction Mechanism (2010-Ongoing) 
In preparation for the more aggressive RPS goal of 33%, the CPUC approved the Renewable Auction 
Mechanism (RAM) in December of 2010. The RAM is a simplified and market-based procurement 
mechanism for eligible renewable energy projects between 3 MW and 20 MW of capacity (DSIRE, 
2012). IOUs are responsible for carrying out the auctions and entering into 20 year power purchase 
agreements with successful renewable energy developers. Each IOU is required to determine the types of 
products (e.g. baseload, peaking, non-peaking) they intend to procure under the RAM to ensure their 
procurement is consistent with their portfolio needs (CPUC, 2010). IOUs also identify interconnection 
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sites for bidding developers and have the discretion to reject certain bids if they fail to meet cost criteria. 
The RAM evolved from the CPUC’s interest in expanding the existing feed-in tariff program in order to 
stimulate renewable energy procurement. However, the RAM is distinct from a traditional feed-in tariff. 
Like a FIT, it is a streamlined contracting mechanism and utilizes a standard contract. Unlike a traditional 
FIT, the RAM relies on market-based pricing and selects projects based on least cost rather than on a 
first-come first-served basis. The rules adopted for the RAM are “intended to reduce transaction costs, 
promote regulatory certainty, and provide value to the market, utility, regulator, and ratepayer” (CPUC, 
2010). The competitive solicitation process is expected to elicit the lowest costs for ratepayers, encourage 
the development of resources that can utilize existing transmission and distribution infrastructure as well 
as contribute to meeting RPS goals. The CPUC has directed California’s three IOUs to use RAM to 
procure 1,000 MW (now expanded to 1,299 MW) over two years through four auctions (DSIRE, 2012). 
The capacity available for bidding is allocated proportionally by the retail sales of each IOU. 
 
Results from the 2011 auction reflect favourably for PV deployment. Out of a total of 130 MW of 
winning bids, the vast majority were PV projects (Vote Solar Initiative, 2012). Most importantly, the 
weighted average of the highest executed contract prices was USD 0.089/kWh. This rate is far less than 
residential electricity prices of just under USD 0.20. And, since this figure reflects the highest bids it is 
likely that many of the successful PV projects were even lower cost. Apparently, this instrument has 
resulted in exceptionally competitive rates in comparison to generous incentives paid through traditional 
support instruments. 
 
General Outcomes 
California’s PV support policies have spurred on considerable growth in the PV sector in terms of both 
deployment and industrial development. More precisely, incentives for PV implemented over the past 
decade or so – including, but not limited to, the RPS, the Go Solar California Initiative, the FIT and the 
RAM – have resulted in a significant increase in PV cumulative installed capacity (see Figure 2) as well 
as growing employment in the sector. According to the Solar Energy Industry Association (2012), in 2011 
alone California saw over 500 MW of solar PV capacity installed. And, as of 2012, employment in 
California’s PV industry amounted to nearly 50,000 jobs. Despite recent turmoil in the PV industry, 
future prospects appear promising, with an anticipated addition of 18,000 to 24,000 jobs over the next 
three years (Lindstrom & Marquez, 2012). Moreover, utilities operating in the state have managed to shift 
their generation heavily towards renewables. Collectively, utilities have increased the renewable energy 
portion of electricity sales from 4% in 2003 to nearly 20% in 2010 (North American Wind Power, 2012). 
However, a sizeable gap remains between current progress and commitments under the RPS (33% 
renewable generation by 2020) along with other initiatives (3,300 MW of PV by 2016). California’s PV 
industry is also faced with many of the same issues (grid integration challenges, opposition by actors 
within the electricity sector, volatile markets and economic conditions, etc) as other jurisdictions. In 
particular, greater penetration of variable renewable energy sources will continue to be a challenge for 
system operators, requiring costly and often controversial grid upgrades (CPUC, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY REPORT PV Policy Frameworks 
 
20  
 
Figure 4: PV Deployment in MW from 2000-2011 in California (Solar Energy Industry Association, 
2012; US Department of Energy, 2011; CEC, 2009) 
 
 
PV POLICY FRAMEWORK IN GERMANY 
 
Introduction 
Germany is widely hailed as one of the prime successes of renewable energy policy, having several times 
reached and surpassed its objectives for both renewable electricity production and greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the share of renewable energy generation in total 
electricity production has increased from 3% in 1990 to 20% in 2011 and solar PV installed capacity has 
multiplied by roughly 25,000 (BMU, 2012a). In the process, the country has: become one of the largest 
markets in the world for solar panels; developed a top-ranked domestic PV manufacturing industry; and, 
employed 380,000 in the German PV industry (BMU, 2012b). These achievements are generally 
attributed to two legislative landmarks: the 1990 Electricity Feed-in Act (StrEG) and the 2000 Renewable 
Energy Act (EEG). The following sections provide a detailed analysis of the German policy framework 
surrounding solar PV, including a brief history of particularly important policies and critical challenges 
that lie ahead.  
 
Context 
With a GDP of USD 3.57 trillion in 2011, Germany is the largest economy in Europe and the 4th largest 
economy in the world. In 2011, the main economic sectors in terms of GDP were manufacturing (22.0%), 
trade, transport, accommodation and food services (15.2%), public services, education and health 
(17.9%), real estate activities (11.6%), and business services (10.7%) (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
2012). The country has a population of 81.7 million, placing it 1st in Europe and 16th in the world in terms 
of inhabitants. It is a federal parliamentary republic comprised of 16 regional states (Länder). The 
national parliament is formed by a lower house (Bundestag) elected directly by the people every four 
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years and an upper house (Bundesrat) populated by delegates from state governments. While all 
legislation must originate in the Bundesrat, the Bundestag is considered more powerful, needing the 
Bundesrat’s consent only for legislation related to revenue shared by the federal and state governments 
(and the dispensation of additional responsibilities to the states). Nevertheless, in practice this occurs 
often, as federal legislation usually has to be carried out by state and local agencies.  
 
In contrast to Ontario and California, Germany is characterized by coalition politics and is home to a 
moderately strong Green Party, which participated in the federal government from 1998 to 2005. The 
executive power is vested in a cabinet headed by the Chancellor, who is elected as head of government by 
– and is responsible to – the Bundestag. The ministries exert a large amount of legislative influence 
through administrative competency, which means that bills are likely to be drafted outside of the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat by the relevant ministry. In practice this can have significant consequences 
since administrative conservativeness sometimes clashes with the current priorities of the administration. 
 
The responsibility for energy policy and legislation rests with the federal government, while states are 
primarily charged with policy implementation (states participate in shaping energy policy mainly through 
the Bundesrat). Traditionally, authority and responsibility for energy policy rested with the Ministry of 
Economics and Technology (BMWi). However, for the last decade, the Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) has seen its role greatly expand to include the market 
adoption of renewable energy sources, research on renewables and more importantly the administration of 
the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG, discussed below). Over this period, the BMU’s resources 
devoted to energy policy also significantly increased (Duffield, 2009). 
 
Electricity Sector in Germany 
Up until the late 1990s, the German electricity sector enjoyed the favourable terms granted in the Energy 
Supply Industry Act of 1935 in addition to an exemption under the Monopolies Act which allowed for 
significant concentration of market power within the sector. Early reform attempts (from 1945 until the 
1990s) failed repeatedly, encountering resistance from politically powerful industry actors (Lauber & 
Mez, 2004, p. 605). More effective restructuring efforts began in 1998 as part of the European Union 
(EU) liberalization process. This process had the somewhat unintended effect of leading to further 
consolidation, with the number of supra-regional utilities involved in large-scale power generation and 
high voltage transmission dropping from eight to four after a series of mergers and acquisitions (Laird & 
Stefes, 2009, p. 2627).  
 
At present, four utilities (Amprion GmbH, 50Hertz Transmission GmbH, Tennet TSO GmbH and 
Transnet BW GmbH) control 90% of the market and despite EU requirements that generation, 
transmission and marketing of electricity be unbundled these companies continue to exert considerable 
control over all market segments. These large utilities have also diversified horizontally (through the 
acquisition of gas companies) and vertically (by swallowing several local and regional utilities). 
Nevertheless, the influence of the Association of German Electrical Utilities (VDEW) – the main lobby 
group for the utilities – has declined since liberalization, weakening opposition to renewable energy. 
Moreover, the creation of the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Posts 
and Railway in 2005, which regulates grid access fees, has further eroded the power of the utilities by 
preventing unfair business practices targeting unwanted competition (Laird & Stefes, 2009, p. 2627).  
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Table 8: Key Actors within the Electricity System in Germany 
 
In regards to ownership, the largest utilities are typically private companies with some public ownership 
(including at different times foreign state companies like Dutch TenneT, French EdF, and Swedish 
Vattenfall), whereas local utilities are often owned by municipalities. At least prior to liberalization this 
allowed for local political influence, which led to policies such as feed-in tariffs for solar energy at the 
community level (Wüstenhagen & Bilharz, 2006, pp. 1683-4). 
 
Electricity output in Germany is dominated by coal, which meets nearly half of electricity demand. 
Nuclear is the next largest generator followed by natural gas. Renewables (including hydroelectricity) 
reached 20% in 2011, up from around 3% in 1990. This has largely been the result of staggering growth 
in installed capacity for wind energy (from the early 1990s) and photovoltaics (from the early 2000s). 
This ramp up is associated with the enactment of the feed-in tariff laws (in 1990 and 2000), the details of 
which are discussed in the following sections. 
 
Figure 5: Electricity Generated by Source in Germany in 2011 (estimates) (IEA, 2012)  
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Key Actors Role 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and nuclear safety (BMU) 
Regulates nuclear safety, radiation protection, climate change 
mitigation, and pollution abatement. Also in charge of managing the 
Renewable Energy Act since 2004. 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
(BMWi) 
Responsible for electricity policy, jointly with the BMU. 
Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Posts and Railway (BNetzA) 
Main network regulator. Oversees utilities with more than 100,000 
customers. For utilities with less than 100,000 customers, authority 
rests with state regulatory offices. The Agency reports to the BMWi. 
Transmission Systems Operators Operates transmission across the country. Dominated by four 
companies: Amprion GmbH, 50Hertz Transmission GmbH, Tennet 
TSO GmbH and Transnet BW GmbH. 
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Early Efforts (1973-1999) 
Germany’s early engagement with PV and renewables in general was founded on: fuel affordability and 
scarcity concerns, underscored by the oil shocks of the 1970s; anti-nuclear sentiments stemming from the 
1986 Chernobyl disaster; the release of a Ministry of Research and Technology study in 1986, which 
concluded that nuclear energy was incompatible with the basic values of a free society; and, a growing 
recognition of climate change as a major policy issue.1 These events culminated in the Electricity Feed-In 
Act (StrEG) in 1990, which established a feed-in tariff for renewable energy producers.  
 
The StrEG required utilities to connect renewable energy producers to the grid and buy their electricity at 
a fixed percentage of the average retail price (between 65% and 90%). These tariff rates seem to indicate 
that the law was intended for smaller wind and hydro projects. The StrEG was a resounding success for 
wind. However, with regard to PV, this first feed-in law had little effect since the tariff covered barely 
10% of the capital costs (Laird and Stefes 2009, p.2622).  
 
Instead, PV deployment was encouraged through the 1,000 Solar Roofs Program launched in 1989, which 
subsidized up to 70% of investment costs for 1-5 kW systems. By the time the program ended in 1995, it 
had resulted in a total of 2250 rooftop installations – with an average size of 2.6 kW – amounting to 6 
MW of installed capacity (Hass, 2001). The withdrawal of subsidies at the completion of the program 
threatened to collapse the burgeoning market. To prevent this collapse, substantial efforts were made by 
solar activists, municipal utilities and state governments (through their utilities) to maintain and expand 
the PV market, which strengthened the resolve of solar associations. The slow PV capacity growth rates 
and the absence of a national support program led German PV firms to start moving their production 
elsewhere, which exerted further pressure on government to develop a new market creation strategy 
(Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006, pp. 265-7; Lauber & Mez, 2004, pp. 604-5). 
 
The main opponents to the StrEG during the 1990s were utilities (especially supra-regional utilities), 
supported by the BMWi. Utilities were opposed to the policy because they were excluded as beneficiaries 
while still expected to develop renewable energy sources (Lauber & Mez, 2006, p. 110). In addition, 
given their interests in conventional power sources and their control over the grid, utilities were generally 
inimical towards both decentralized energy systems and production from renewable sources. Their 
opposition was at first irresolute, mostly because it was believed that the law would not have a noticeable 
impact, and because they were too busy with seizing expansion opportunities in East Germany after 
reunification began. After the success of the StrEG for wind power, however, utilities began challenging 
the law politically and through the courts (including at the EU level) (Laird & Stefes, 2009, pp. 2622-
2624; Agnolucci, 2006, pp. 3544-3546). 
 
The 100,000 Solar Roofs Program (1999-2003) 
The 1998 election saw the formation of a coalition government made up of the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) and the Green Party. This new administration launched the 100,000 Solar Roofs Program (HTRP) 
in 1999, with the initial goal of installing 300 MW of PV by 2004. The program provided low-interest 
loans and grants which covered roughly 35% of total system costs. This support was insufficient however, 
and the program achieved little success in its first year. When new higher FIT rates for PV were 
                                                 
1 For a detailed history, see Jacobsson & Lauber (2006) and Lauber & Mez (2004). 
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introduced in late 1999, the market for PV installations markedly accelerated. The passage of the EEG in 
2000, which carried forward these rates, prompted legislators to reduce the incentives under the HTRP. 
Consequently, interest rates for loans under the program were increased while the waiver for the last loan 
instalment was removed (Stryi-Hipp, 2004a; Stryi-Hipp, 2004b).  
 
Despite the fact that the original targets for installed capacity were increased substantially in 2000, the 
program still ended earlier than initially planned. The program was terminated in June 2003, having 
surpassed its goals. FIT rates were raised to compensate for the completion of the program (see next 
section). Overall, over 45,000 PV systems were supported through the HTRP, adding 346 MW to 
Germany’s installed capacity (Stryi-Hipp, 2004b). 
 
The Renewable Energy Act (2000-Ongoing) 
The Renewable Energy Act (EEG), introduced in 2000, remains the primary support legislation for PV in 
Germany. The current configuration of the FIT law offers PV developers a 20-year fixed-rate contract 
differentiated by installation size, type and location. As of June 2012, rates ranged from €0.135 to 
€0.1952. The tariff structure incorporates a monthly rate decrease of around 1%, adjusted based on prior 
installed capacity to ensure a ‘growth corridor’ of 2,500–3,500 MW per year. A cap for terminating 
government support has also been established, triggering once installed capacity reaches 52 GW (total 
installations amount to 28 GW as of mid-2012).  
 
The primary objectives of the EEG include: facilitating sustainable energy development through 
reductions in GHG emissions and environmental impacts; increasing the portion of renewable energy 
capacity in the supply mix; and, increasing the share of renewable energy in consumption (BMU, 2000). 
 
The EEG addressed opposition to renewable energy deployment more effectively than previous 
mechanisms. In order to appease opposition from the utilities, two concessions were built into the EEG. 
First, unlike the StrEG, utilities were now eligible to participate under the law, allowing support for large-
scale projects. Second, the law provided a mechanism to spread costs evenly among utilities, an issue that 
had become contentious as the share of renewables was nearing the 10% mark in some service areas3. 
Nevertheless, the law was not immune to difficulties. 
                                                 
2 For installations put into service as of April 1st. See Table 2 below for details. 
3,3 The StrEG had provided a hardship clause that forced the upstream electricity supplier (usually the large 
transmission operators) to take over the purchase obligation if the lower-level utility faced ‘inequitable hardship’ 
(i.e., if more than 5% of the electricity it distributed within its area came from renewables eligible to the tariff). 
Although this was rarely a problem in the 1990s, one of the complaints of the large supra-regional utilities was that 
there was no compensation scheme to spread the burden evenly between regions, and utilities from northern 
regions paid most of the tariff payments. Eventually the 1998 Energy Supply Industry Act, which was adopted to 
transpose the European Electricity Directive 96/92/EC, provided more specific rules, essentially limiting the share 
of renewables that was eligible to the feed-in tariff for a given region to 10% (5% at two different levels). Over that 
cap, utilities did not have to pay the tariff to the producer, and given that some regions were approaching the 10% 
mark at the time, the new rules were at best a very temporary solution and produced uncertainty in the industry. 
The EEG 2000 came with a more elaborate mechanism, where local grid operators could always transfer costs to 
higher up utilities, and costs were equalized at the transmission line level across the entire country (see 
Wüstenhagen & Bilharz (2006, pp. 1684, 1687) and Lauber & Mez (2006, p. 107)). This has been replaced by a 
market-based system where electricity generated under the EEG is sold by the grid operators in the day-ahead 
market (Neeser, 2011).  
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Although the EEG is largely responsible for the significant growth in PV deployment over the last decade 
(see Figure 2), the policy experienced a series of changes and encountered a variety of challenges since its 
inception. Throughout the early years (2000-2004), the tariff rates under the EEG were too low to support 
PV. Expansion was only the result of the overlap of both the FIT and HTRP incentives. Complicating 
matters further, the earliest iteration of the EEG had a fairly limited capacity ceiling of 350 MW (later 
increased to 1,000 MW). Together, these factors created a degree of uncertainty for the PV industry. 
However, when the HTRP was terminated in 2003, the capacity ceiling was removed and tariff rates were 
raised to prevent a market collapse. This amendment, which officially passed in 2004, made PV 
financially viable under a single policy for the first time, resulting in a solar boom (Laird & Stefes, 2009, 
p. 2626). 
 
A particularly significant early development for the EEG involved the transfer of policy authority from 
the BMWi to the BMU in 2002. Given that legislation drafting expertise mostly rested with the ministries, 
the amendment process would now be dominated by the BMU – a traditional proponent of renewable 
energy development – with the BMWi limited to arguing for additional downward adjustments to the 
tariff rates. This is one of the reasons why the 2004 amendment, with its corresponding higher FIT rates, 
passed with relatively little resistance. Over the ensuing years, other major amendments were enacted, but 
support for the law was generally unwavering and the changes were usually designed from a policy 
improvement perspective. 
 
The emergence of a conservative-led coalition in 2005 did create concerns about cuts to the program. 
However, the result of the election forced the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to include the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) in a coalition government. Consequently, the core principles of the EEG were 
kept intact. Moreover, by this juncture the momentum for the EEG, reinforced by the remarkable growth 
of the PV sector, made it increasingly uncomfortable for the new Merkel government to make substantial 
revisions to the law. This illustrates the maturity of the EEG in German politics as most modifications 
were implemented to enhance the operation of the system (while still reducing rates). Prior to 2012, the 
most prominent modifications included: an improved equalisation mechanism to distribute the costs of the 
policy among utilities (through the AusglMechV and the AusglMechAV)3; the introduction of a sliding 
scale for PV compensation, where the tariff rate is dependent on the capacity installed in the previous 
years; the introduction of a self-consumption premium to incentivize onsite consumption; and, the 
expansion of reporting requirements by solar system operators. More recently, the Fukushima disaster has 
intensified efforts to phase-out nuclear and deepened the societal commitment to renewables. The 
controversy surrounding several tariff cuts since 2010 have however indicated that government support 
for PV will continue to decrease rapidly. 
 
The German solar sector, like the global market, experienced a turbulence year in 2011. While annual 
installed capacity across the country reached a record high of 7.5GW, the vast overcapacity worldwide 
among cell and module manufacturers led to price drops that destabilized the industry. As a result, several 
companies have encountered financial difficulties. These events have not yet affected job numbers for 
Germany, but it is expected that there will be an impact by the end of 2012 (BMU, 2012b, p. 9).  
Additionally, the massive deployment of PV in 2011 provoked a series of changes to the EEG. In June 
2012, the German parliament agreed on a new structure for tariff reductions. Under the amendment, solar 
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PV FIT rates suffered a one-time cut of 20%-30% (depending on the type and size of the installation) 
along with a new monthly reduction rate of 1% (mentioned above). Starting in November 2012, this 
monthly reduction rate will be adjusted depending on installed capacity in order to respect the growth 
corridor. If installations exceed targets, rates will be decrease by up to 2.8%. In contrast, if installations 
are insufficient, rates will decrease by less than 1%, or will even increase by up to 0.5% if the targets are 
substantially missed. Finally, new installations over 10MW will cease to receive support (see Table 2 for 
further details). 
 
The June 2012 amendment marked a pronounced shift in PV policy support, with the more explicit aim of 
guiding PV into a post-FIT era (it is important to note that PV generation is already competitive with 
retail electricity rates in several regions). Under the new amendment, FIT incentive payments are now 
capped at 90% of electricity generation for installations between 10kW and 1MW (commercial size). The 
remaining 10% must either be consumed onsite or sold on the spot or wholesale market, encouraging the 
siting of PV installations in regions with higher electricity prices. The premium for electricity consumed 
onsite (instituted in 2009) was also removed, while a market premium system was introduced to 
encourage developers to participate in wholesale market operations and maximize the market value of PV 
generation. Overall, the amendment attempts to initiate the integration of PV into conventional electricity 
markets and highlights the context of waning policy support.4 
 
Figure 6 – PV Deployment in MW from 2000-2011 in Germany (BMU, 2012a) 
 
 
Table 9: German FIT schedule for solar PV after 2012 amendment, in Euro ct/kWh (BMU, 2012c) 
                                                 
4 For a detailed analysis of the changes introduced in the 2012 amendment, see Fulton & Capalino (2012). 
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 Installed in, at or on building or noise protection wall 
Freestanding 
facility 
0: N: N: 0: 0: 
Generation covered by FIT 100% 90% 90% 100% 100% 
Put into service as of April 1st, 2012 19.50 18.50 16.50 13.50 13.50 
Put into service as of May 1st, 2012 19.31 18.32 16.34 13.37 13.37 
Put into service as of June 1st, 2012 19.11 18.13 16.17 13.23 13.23 
Put into service as of July 1st, 2012 18.92 17.95 16.01 13.10 13.10 
Put into service as of August 1st, 2012 18.73 17.77 15.85 12.97 12.97 
Put into service as of September 1st, 2012 18.54 17.59 15.69 12.84 12.84 
Put into service as of October 1st, 2012 18.36 17.42 15.53 12.71 12.71 
Put into service as of November 1st To be announced by the Federal Network Agency by October 31
st, 2012 at the 
latest. Will depend on newly installed capacity in July, August and September 
 
General Outcomes 
PV is thus paying a price for its success, one which follows from its passage from a niche industry to an 
important economic sector. The considerable growth in new installations in recent years has intensified 
the debate over appropriate levels of support. With the overwhelming success PV incentive programs 
have enjoyed in terms of deployment and price reductions, it has become easier to argue that the industry 
should now be able to stand on its own (as recurring debates on reducing EEG tariffs have indicated). 
Nevertheless, negotiations over tariff cuts since 2009 have revealed the maturity of the policy, and 
changes are usually enacted to quickly resolve any gaps or issues within the rule structure. As a result, 
Germany’s FIT program has gradually become a highly sophisticated instrument, although the FIT rates 
themselves have continued to be set politically and administratively.  
 
Overall, despite encouraging results, PV faces several key short- and medium-term challenges in 
Germany. First, the German grid is grappling with increased penetration of intermittent renewables and 
capacity issues. The 10-year grid upgrade plan, released in draft version in May of 2012 (BNetzA, 2012), 
represents another instance where the additional costs of renewables will likely be brought to the forefront 
of public debates. Second, the growing dominance of Chinese firms within the solar market is raising 
concerns for the domestic industry. The drop in cell and module prices and the ensuing turbulence in the 
PV industry in 2011/12 have left several domestic manufacturers in financial difficulty. Lastly, anti-
dumping measures are now being considered by the German government to prevent further adverse 
impacts from cheap asian cell and module imports (Reuters, 2012; Bradsher, 2012).  
 
These challenges are not German-specific by any means as other jurisdictions around the world face 
similar difficulties. However, the size of the German market and the massive public investments made by 
this jurisdiction in support of PV make these issues all the more important. 
 
LESSONS 
 
Overview 
In many ways, the developments surrounding PV illustrate the challenges of long-term policy 
engagement. Well-developed proponents and opponents have emerged and organized around PV policy 
issues. These actors have influenced public debate with respect to the future of incentive mechanisms and 
policy support in general. Social and technical challenges have also gained traction within these debates 
and complicated the rollout of PV. The industrial landscape surrounding solar has experienced severe 
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turbulence as plant closures and bankruptcies have become commonplace. It is within this context that PV 
policy is now being developed and maturing. 
 
The above case studies reveal a number of key lessons for policymakers engaging or seeking to engage 
with PV policy support. The following sections outline the importance of: (1) adapting policy objectives 
to recent developments, (2) developing an integrated approach to PV deployment and support; (3) 
balancing electricity consumer and PV developer interests; and, (4) encouraging participation and 
maintaining equity in PV policy development.  
 
Adapting policy objectives to recent developments 
Policy support for PV has been developed to address several policy objectives. In the case of Germany, 
the country’s long-term investment in PV has primarily been associated with shifting the electricity 
system towards a more sustainable configuration. That is, German renewable energy policy has been 
concerned with achieving GHG reductions as well as moving away from nuclear power. In California, 
recent engagement with PV support has largely been founded on commitments surrounding climate 
change. The RPS targets and related support framework are principally linked to reducing the electricity 
system’s reliance on fossil fuels and the associated GHG emissions. Support for PV in both these 
countries can also be understood in terms of energy security, local environmental improvements (air 
quality for instance) as well as encouraging technological advancement and industrial development. 
 
Ontario has also articulated similar goals within its PV policy framework. In particular, successfully 
phasing out coal has been promoted as a key justification for encouraging PV and other renewable energy 
technologies. However, the most prominent objectives embedded within the current policy framework are 
economic in nature. Several stated policy objectives correspond to the development of a local industry for 
renewable energy technology manufacturing and installation. Policy documents often emphasize the 
employment benefits stemming from PV and renewable support. Recently, these objectives have become 
increasingly problematic. 
 
Given recent developments, a primarily economic rationale for PV support presents a number of 
interrelated perils for long-term policy engagement surrounding PV. The current industrial landscape – 
involving the scaling up of Asian module and cell manufacturers, massive price reductions and 
competitive global PV market – has limited the economic benefits associated with PV support. Countries 
hoping to develop a domestic module manufacturing industry through aggressive policy support are now 
forced to compete with established low-cost manufacturers or erect contentious trade barriers. Ontario has 
a domestic content requirement which functions as a kind of trade barrier, while the United States has 
enacted trade tariffs on Chinese PV imports. Germany is now contemplating similar trade barriers in order 
to prevent further domestic PV manufacturing declines. These barriers, although sheltering domestic 
producers, result in inefficiencies for the market as the cost of PV systems are artificially inflated. In turn, 
the cost of support – often reflected in electricity rates – increases. Consequently, PV installations suffer 
and public acceptance issues arise (as is the case in Ontario).  
 
The industrial landscape surrounding PV is now far riskier for new entrants and the industrial 
development benefits flowing from policy support are becoming increasingly questionable. This context 
makes PV support grounded on an industrial policy rationale vulnerable to change as objectives (the 
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development of a profitable and competitive domestic module manufacturing industry) are unlikely to be 
achieved within this highly commoditized market. Nevertheless, substantial industrial development 
opportunities do exist within specialized and niche markets (building-integrated PV for instance). 
 
An integrated approach 
The case studies illustrate that the integration of PV and other intermittent renewables into conventional 
electricity systems has resulted in numerous difficulties for system operators. Transmission and 
distribution capacity constraints have emerged as key barriers to additional renewable deployment. 
Variability has made balancing supply and demand increasingly challenging, undermining the reliability 
of the electricity system. While improvements to forecasting and investments in natural gas (as backup) 
may help mitigate some of these problems, difficulties continue to escalate as more and more intermittent 
renewables come online. In brief, it appears that leading jurisdictions for renewable energy support are 
becoming victims of their own success as renewable deployment outpaces the capacity of existing 
electricity systems. 
 
Potential solutions involve the modernization of the electricity system through the development of a 
smarter, more distributed grid (involving two-way information and energy flows, distributed community 
energy systems, the adoption of demand response technologies, electricity storage, electric vehicles, etc). 
The redesign of the electricity system along these lines is well placed to handle the increased penetration 
of variable renewables. Since PV and other renewables are a component of this broader system, their 
advancement should be considered within the context of the advancement of the system as a whole. This 
system transformation requires an integrated approach aimed at simultaneously rolling out several 
emerging technologies and new practices. Fundamentally, expansion plans need to consider grid 
infrastructure (transmission and distribution), smarter technologies (integrating information technology), 
changing practices (conservation and time of use pricing) in addition to individual generating 
technologies like PV. 
 
Support for PV should thus be embedded within an integrated policy framework aimed at encouraging a 
low-carbon transformation of the electricity system. With respect to electricity supply, the deployment of 
renewable energy technologies should continue. However, new incentive mechanisms should be crafted 
to help bring complementary technologies online. In terms of electricity demand, smart devices capable of 
demand response as well as conservation opportunities should be explored. Moreover, this framework 
should consider potential linkages between PV and other sectors (the construction industry for instance) 
and attempt to open up new industrial development opportunities (such as building-integrated PV). 
 
Balancing electricity consumer and PV developer interests 
Balancing the interests of electricity consumers and PV developers within a PV support framework is a 
difficult task that if addressed inappropriately may open up the policy to criticism. As the case studies 
indicate, the German and Ontario approaches are predominantly government-directed. That is, incentive 
rates are largely politically and bureaucratically determined. These jurisdictions use installation capacity 
feedback to gauge appropriate levels of support but do not incorporate a market mechanism to ensure 
cost-efficiency. Consequently, there is an opportunity to set rates too high and for too long if adequate 
care is not employed in studying market conditions and fine tuning rates and rules. 
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Much of the controversy surrounding PV support in Ontario can be linked to a failure to appropriately set 
and revise rates. Rates were left at incredibly favourable levels for roughly two years following the FIT 
program’s inception. As a result, cost reductions and innovation were not reflected in the incentive rate 
structure and ratepayers were burdened with unnecessary costs related to overgenerous contracts. FIT 
incentive rates (in conjunction with wind turbine siting issues) catalyzed opposition against renewable 
energy support during the 2011 provincial elections. Inflated incentive rates drew the ire of electricity 
consumers and provoked calls to terminate the FIT program, resulting in tremendous uncertainty for PV 
developers. In doing so, overgenerous incentives undermined the objectives they were meant to achieve. 
 
California, on the other hand, has taken considerable care to avoid potential ratepayer backlash. The state 
employs a market-directed framework which incorporates feedback from auctions and requests for 
proposals to set appropriate incentive rates. In other words, support levels are based on market 
competition rather than administratively determined. Basing inventive rates on competition helps to 
legitimize the rate structure, protects ratepayer interests and ensures that least-cost production is secured. 
Price reductions appear to be more effectively encouraged under a market-directed approach as is 
reflected by the low support levels in California. However, an abundant solar resource and other 
contextual factors certainly play a role in determining costs, making comparisons difficult. 
 
Encouraging participation and maintaining equity 
The potential of a targeted and inclusive approach has emerged as a key theme in this study. Ontario and 
many European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and others) rely heavily on a single policy instrument 
(the FIT) to incentivize PV deployment, whereas, in California, a portfolio of policies (the FIT, RAM, 
RPS and Go Solar California programs) have been implemented to encourage the diffusion of PV. 
California’s policy framework targets individual segments of the PV market and facilitates the adoption 
of PV by a variety of actors. An inclusive approach is well-suited to building support for PV deployment, 
breaking down potential barriers and capitalizing on new market opportunities for PV.  
 
The PV policy framework in California has attempted to mitigate potential negative impacts for 
vulnerable households by enlisting them in the rollout of PV. There is an interest in encouraging the 
participation of lower income individuals through various tailored incentives (SASH and MASH), a more 
equitable distribution of benefits (decreased electricity consumption and bills) and a relatively progressive 
electricity rate structure which blunts the costs associated with grid upgrades. This involvement may have 
interesting implications for changing practices and public acceptance amongst low-income communities 
who are often left out of PV incentive schemes. 
 
Interestingly, Ontario’s recent FIT revisions have attempted to increase the amount of equity communities 
and local organizations hold in PV installations. Yet, it is unclear whether Ontario’s new point system 
will be sufficient to encourage participation from a wider group of stakeholders. 
 
An inclusive approach to PV support should continue to be explored and expanded. New ownership and 
financing models should also be considered to allow for more diverse community participation. In 
contrast to traditional external ownership models, local participation may help to mitigate public 
acceptance challenges and siting issues as well as facilitate more active involvement in energy use. 
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